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AUV: Abrüstung und Verifikation

AUV 7: Verifikation aus der Luft, Modellierung und Abrüstung

AUV 7.3: Fachvortrag

Freitag, 27. März 1998, 11:30–12:00, T

Attribute Sampling over Time: Optimal Sampling Strategies for Interim Inspection — •Daniel Rothenstein¹ and Morton Canty² — ¹Programmgruppe Technologiefolgenforschung, Forschungs"-zen"-trum J"ulich — ²Programmgruppe Technologiefolgenforschung, Forschungs"-zent"-rum J"ulich

The periodic re-verification of n identical locations for timely detection of illegal activity is modeled as a non-cooperative, two-person game between Inspector and Inspectee. It is assumed that the game terminates after a reference period of length 1, and that the Inspector performs k inspections in all. Timeliness is parameterized by a critical detection time t<1. The Inspectee can violate at one location during the reference period, or he can behave legally. The utilities are chosen such that the Inspector prefers legal behavior to timely detection and timely detection to untimely detection, while the Inspectee prefers untimely detection to legal behavior and legal behavior to timely detection. Optimal strategies for Inspector and Inspectee are determined as Nash equilibria. In particular, the conditions for legal behavior (deterrence) are investigated.