Dresden 2000 – scientific programme

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AKA: Physik und Abrüstung

AKA 4: Produktion und Detektion von nuklearen Materialien

AKA 4.1: Invited Talk

Friday, March 24, 2000, 10:15–11:15, G 38

Detection of Clandestine Activities, Verification of Nuclear Materials and Sites, and Assessment of New Reactors and Fuel Cycle Concepts — •J. Magill, R. Schenkel, and L. Koch — Institute for Transuranium Elements, 76125 Karlsruhe

The Institute for Transuranium Elements is one of the central laboratories developing verification technology to check nation state compliance with their non-proliferation committments. Some of this technology can also be used for verification purposes within the fissile material cut-off agreement proposed by President Clinton in 1993. In this paper, we describe recent developments at the Institute:

- in the detection of clandestine activites - analyses of dusts from swipe sample can reveal how facilities are being used. Measurements cover composition (chemical and nuclear) and micro-structure, "age", origin, and production route.

- in the "on-site labs" for fissile material accountancy in the large reprocessing plants at Sellafield and La Hague. Instead of probes being sent to centralised laboratories, they are analysed locally "on-site", thereby avoiding complex and time-consuming transport of radioactive material.

- on the assessment of proliferation problems associated with high power accelerators, new fuel cycles, and partitioning and transmutation technology.