Dresden 2003 – scientific programme
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AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
AKSOE 3: Postersitzung
AKSOE 3.10: Poster
Monday, March 24, 2003, 15:45–17:15, P1
Spatial Patterns in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games with Various Strategies — •Robert Mach1,2 and Frank Schweitzer2,3 — 1Institute for Theoretical Physics, Cologne University, D-50923 Koeln, Germany — 2Fraunhofer Institute for Autonomous Intelligent Systems, Schloss Birlinghoven, D-53757 Sankt Augustin, Germany — 3Institute for Physics, Humboldt University, D-10099 Berlin
By means of a two-dimensional cellular automaton we investigate an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game with 8 different strategies and one-step memory. Spatially distributed agents are assumed to interact in a local neighborhood and to adopt the strategy of their most successful neighbors after each generation, this way increasing their individual payoff. Particular emphasis is on the temporal change of the spatial distribution of the different strategies and their global frequencies. In order to get a better insight into the dynamics, we further vary the stochasticity, the size of the local neighborhood and the number of interactions per generation.