Dresden 2003 – scientific programme

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AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AKSOE 3: Postersitzung

AKSOE 3.11: Poster

Monday, March 24, 2003, 15:45–17:15, P1

Emergence of Complex Networks from Game-Theoretic Interactions — •Stefan Bornholdt² and Holger Ebel¹ — ¹Institut für Theoretische Physik, Universität Kiel, 24098 Kiel, Germany — ²IZBI, Universität Leipzig, Kreuzstr. 7b, 04103 Leipzig, Germany

The emergence of complex networks from coevolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners [1]. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is defined on a random network with agents as nodes and games along the links [2]. The agents change their neighborhoods to improve their payoff. The system relaxes to stationary states corresponding to cooperative Nash equilibria with the additional property that no agent can improve its payoff by changing its neighborhood. Small perturbations of the system lead to avalanches of strategy readjustments reestablishing equilibrium. The different regimes of relaxation dynamics can be explained in detail by the introduction of a confined branching process. For critical and supercritical avalanche dynamics, the network of interactions develops non-trivial topological properties as a broad degree distribution suggesting scale-free behavior, small-world characteristics, and assortative mixing.

[1] H. Ebel and S. Bornholdt, e-print cond-mat/0211666 (2002).

[2] H. Ebel and S. Bornholdt, Phys. Rev. E 66, 056118 (2002).