Regensburg 2004 – scientific programme

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AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AKSOE 4: Soziale Systeme und Entscheidungsmodelle I

AKSOE 4.1: Invited Talk

Tuesday, March 9, 2004, 09:30–10:15, H8

Stochastic Games: Theory and Simulation — •Kristian Lindgren — Physical Resource Theory, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden

Recent results regarding games in an evolutionary context is presented. The main part of the talk deals with the evolution of cooperative behaviour in a random environment, using evolution of finite state strategies. The interaction between agents is modelled by a repeated game with random observable payoffs. The agents are thus faced with a more complex situation, compared to the Prisoner’s Dilemma that has been widely used for investigating the conditions for cooperation in evolving populations. Still, there is a robust cooperating strategy that usually evolves in a population of agents. In the cooperative mode, this strategy selects an action that allows for maximizing the payoff sum of both players in each round, regardless of the own payoff. Two such players maximize the expected total long-term payoff. If the opponent deviates from this scheme, the strategy invokes a punishment action, which may be to aim for minimising the opponent’s score for the rest of the (possibly infinitely) repeated game.
15 min. Pause