Berlin 2005 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
AKSOE 11: Social, Information and Production Networks II
AKSOE 11.2: Vortrag
Dienstag, 8. März 2005, 14:30–15:00, TU P-N203
Selfish vs. Unselfish Optimization of Network Creation — •Johannes J. Schneider1 and Scott Kirkpatrick2 — 1Institute of Physics, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Staudinger Weg 7, 55099 Mainz, Germany — 2School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, Israel
In the last few years, many properties of the Internet have been detected which are not found in simple random networks. The question arises which basic mechanisms lead to this structure of the Internet. In fact, the Internet appears to be a “game”, in which many independent agents manage its components to suit their own needs, e.g., by buying and selling links. In the “network creation” model [1], agents have to buy links in order to establish a network for sending messages to each other. Buying each link costs a constant amount, α, sending a message costs the minimum number of hops between sender and receiver. Depending on the value of α and on the allowed behaviors of the agents, we get to different types of networks created with this model [2].
[1] A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C. H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker, On a Network Creation Game, PODC Proceedings, 2003, 347-351.
[2] J. J. Schneider and S. Kirkpatrick, Selfish vs. Unselfish Optimization of Network Creation, submitted to J. Stat. Mech.