Berlin 2005 – scientific programme

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AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AKSOE 3: Evolutionary Game Theory

AKSOE 3.1: Talk

Friday, March 4, 2005, 16:30–17:00, TU P-N203

Iterated prisoners dilemma on networks with adaptive topology under perfect rationality — •Christoly Biely and Stefan Thurner — Complex System Research Group, Medical University of Vienna - HNO Bauteil 86, Waehringer Guertel 18-20, A-1090 Vienna, Austria

Up to now analysis of the actions chosen by agents playing the iterated prisoners dilemma game on networks has concentrated on the time evolution of the respective system with constant link structure and rules based on imitation.

In contrast, we present the results of a model which determines the time evolution of the draws in a system with variable link structure and update rules based on perfect rationality. The model is based on the conception that defecting players are sanctioned by the potential termination of the game by their co-players. Conversely, cooperating agents are implicitly rewarded by the possibility to acquire new co-players for the subsequent games.

Conducted simulations show that in spite of the rationality of the respective actors - which would result in the nash equilibrium of overall defection in a system of constant network-topology - cooperation emerges. Choosing appropriate model-parameters we obtain time-dependent networks, which are characterized by high density of cooperating agents and isolation of defecting players.