Dresden 2006 – scientific programme

Parts | Days | Selection | Search | Downloads | Help

AKSOE: Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AKSOE 12: Economic Models and Evolutionary Game Theory II

AKSOE 12.3: Talk

Thursday, March 30, 2006, 11:15–11:45, BAR 205

Individual strategies and group dynamics in complementarity games — •Juergen Jost and Wei Li — Max Planck Institut fuer Mathematik in den Naturwissenschaften, Inselstr.22, 04229 Leipzig

We introduce and study a complementarity game where members of a population play repeated games with different, randomly drawn members of the opposite (symmetric population), and the populations are recomposed according to evolutionary schemes like genetic algorithms after fixed numbers of rounds. We can then break the symmetry between the two populations by assigning them different strategy spaces, for example building their move upon the outcomes of their previous encounters or rather on the experience of their successful neighbors in a specified or evolvable network. This leads to an interesting interplay between individual strategy adaptation and group level dynamics. the rules of the game are the following: A member of population A (called buyers) and one of member B (sellers), randomly drawn from their respective population, make each an offer k_A and k_B, between 0 and some K (e.g.=100). When k_A > k_B, a deal is concluded, and the buyer pays k_A and the seller receives k_B. If not, the seller pays K, and the buyer receives 0. When, for example, the members of A play a consistent strategy of making low offers, they can force a less organized seller population into accepting such low offers eventually. The question then is how such a strategy that is good for the population as a whole can evolve from the individual gain maximizing strategies of the individual members. We present systematic comparisons and results.