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AKSOE: Arbeitskreis Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
AKSOE 8: Economic Models and Evolutionary Game Theory II
AKSOE 8.1: Vortrag
Dienstag, 27. März 2007, 14:00–14:30, H8
The Role of Social Structure in the Emergence of Cooperation — •Carlos P. Roca1, José A. Cuesta1, Ángel Sánchez1,2, Víctor M. Eguíluz3, and Maxi San Miguel3 — 1Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain — 2Instituto de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain — 3Instituto Mediterráneo de Estudios Avanzados (IMEDEA), CSIC-UIB, Palma de Mallorca, Spain
The emergence of cooperation is currently one of the most fundamental open questions in evolutionary game theory. Since the seminal work of Nowak and May [1] it has been widely accepted that cooperative behavior is favored by the social structure of a population. However, more recent studies [2,3] have limited or contradicted this result, showing that this enforcement varies largely with the specific game or network considered. It is then natural to ask to what extent does social structure support the emergence and stability of cooperation. To answer this, we have performed an extensive and systematic simulation of evolutionary games on networks, taking into account the different possibilities of social dilemmas, population dynamics (updating rules) and network structures. We show that the support of cooperative behavior is not universal but only occurs in particular combinations of games, updating rules and networks.
[1] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May, Nature 359, 826 (1992)
[2] C. Hauert and M. Doebeli, Nature 428, 643 (2004)
[3] F.C. Santos, J.M Pacheco et al, PNAS 103, 3490 (2006)