Dresden 2009 – scientific programme

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AGSOE: Arbeitsgruppe Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AGSOE 11: Economic Models and Evolutionary Game Theory III

AGSOE 11.4: Talk

Wednesday, March 25, 2009, 11:45–12:15, BAR 205

Efficiency based strategy spreading in the prisoner’s dilemma game — •Sebastian Weber and Markus Porto — Institut für Festkörperphysik, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany

In contrast to well-mixed populations, discrete interaction patterns have been shown to support cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and a scale-free network topology may even lead to a dominance of cooperation over defection. The majority of studies assumes a strategy adoption scheme based on accumulated payoffs. The use of accumulated payoffs, however, is incompatible with the integral property of the underlying replicator dynamics to be invariant under a positive affine transformation of the payoff function. We show that using instead the payoff per interaction to determine the strategy spread, which has been suggested recently and recovers the required invariance, results in fundamentally different dynamical behavior [1]. Most notably, in such an efficiency based scenario the advantage of a scale-free network topology vanishes almost completely. We present a detailed explanation of the fundamentally altered dynamical behavior.

[1] S. Weber, and M. Porto, submitted