Dresden 2009 – scientific programme

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AGSOE: Arbeitsgruppe Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AGSOE 12: Economic Models and Evolutionary Game Theory IV

AGSOE 12.1: Talk

Wednesday, March 25, 2009, 14:00–14:30, BAR 205

Evolutionary Dynamics with High Mutation Rates — •Arne Traulsen — Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany

Evolutionary game theory describes systems in which successful strategies spread in a population. It is usually argued that it equally applies to genetical reproduction and to social imitation. However, while biological mutation rates are small, social mutation or exploration rates may be high. This can have a decisive impact on the evolution of cooperation and punishment [1]. Under weak selection, all strategies have similar abundance and one may argue that increasing the mutation rates does not change the strategy abundance. However, it can be shown that even for weak selection, different conditions for the abundance of strategies are obtained in n × n games for high and low mutation rates [2]. Only for 2 × 2 games, the condition under which one strategy is more abundant than the other does not depend on the mutation rate at all [3].

[1] A. Traulsen, C. Hauert, H. de Silva, M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund, PNAS, in press

[2] T. Antal, A. Traulsen, H. Ohtsuki, C. Tarnita, and M.A. Nowak, arXiv:0811.2009

[3] T. Antal, M.A. Nowak, and A. Traulsen, JTB, in press, arXiv:0809.2804