Dresden 2009 – scientific programme

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AGSOE: Arbeitsgruppe Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

AGSOE 14: Poster Session

AGSOE 14.2: Poster

Wednesday, March 25, 2009, 18:10–20:00, P1B

Three-site cluster approximation for the evolution of adoption rules in Prisoner’s Dilemma games — •Jeromos Vukov, Attila Szolnoki, and György Szabó — Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary

We study spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma games where the distribution of both the strategies and strategy adoption rules can evolve depending on the payoff differences between neighboring players. Players are located on the sites of a kagome lattice where the overlapping triangles support the spreading of cooperation. Choosing between unconditional cooperation and defection, the players gain their payoff from games with their neighbors. Each individual strategy adoption rule is characterized by a single (temperature-like) parameter describing how strongly the adoptions depend on the payoff-difference. If we start the system from a random strategy distribution with many adoption rules, the co-evolution of strategies and adoption rules drives the system to a final state where only one adoption rule remains. This adoption rule is in good agreement with the parameter value associated to the highest cooperativity in the region where cooperators and defectors coexist. The predictions of the three-site approximation agree very well with the results of Monte Carlo simulations. In this poster, we give a thorough overview about the method of this type of approximation.