Regensburg 2010 – scientific programme

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BP: Fachverband Biologische Physik

BP 10: Evolutionary Game Theory I (joint SOE, BP)

BP 10.5: Talk

Tuesday, March 23, 2010, 10:45–11:00, H44

Social Dilemmas for Players with Complex Personality Profiles — Tadeusz Platkowski and •Jan Zakrzewski — Deparment of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw

We develop a theory of evolution of social systems based on the imitation rule which generalizes the standard proportional fitness rule of the evolutionary game theory. The formalism is applied to describe the dynamics of various types of social dilemma games played in infinite populations. In particular the theory predicts the non-zero level of cooperation in the long run for the Public Good games, the existence of the nonunique stable polymorphism for particular classes of the Prisoner's Dilemma games, and stable asymptotic cooperation level for coordination games in the N-person setting, for which the standard replicator dynamics approach predicted the instable polymorphism.