Regensburg 2010 – scientific programme

Parts | Days | Selection | Search | Downloads | Help

BP: Fachverband Biologische Physik

BP 11: Evolutionary Game Theory II (joint SOE, BP)

BP 11.2: Talk

Tuesday, March 23, 2010, 11:30–11:45, H44

Evolutionary adaptation of a social norm optimizes node degree and investments on an adaptive network — •Johannes Hoefener and Thilo Gross — Max-Planck-Institut für Physik komplexer Systeme, Nöthnitzer Str. 38, 01187 Dresden, Germany

Humans established complex networks of cooperation, which are essential for our modern society. Cooperating with just a single person is not efficient and cooperating with everyone is not even possible. Thus every individual has to decide if and how much it should invest into a certain cooperation. Because the payoff provided by a cooperation is usually not known when the investments have to be done, individuals may base their decision on heuristics or social norms. These, for instance may follow the statement: “Get more. Give more." Here we study a continuous prisoner’s dilemma game on an adaptive network, where the investment into cooperation is determined by a social norm function. We assume that the general form of the function is fixed, but allow the function to be modified by evolutionary adaptation of it’s parameters. We show that this adaptation not only establishes stable cooperation but also optimizes the node degree as well as the investments in the remaining cooperations.