Regensburg 2010 – scientific programme
Parts | Days | Selection | Search | Downloads | Help
BP: Fachverband Biologische Physik
BP 11: Evolutionary Game Theory II (joint SOE, BP)
BP 11.3: Talk
Tuesday, March 23, 2010, 11:45–12:00, H44
A Homclinic Route to Full Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game on Adaptive Networks — •Gerd Zschaler1, Arne Traulsen2, and Thilo Gross1 — 1Max-Planck-Institut für Physik komplexer Systeme, Dresden, Germany — 2Max-Planck-Institut für Evolutionsbiologie, Plön, Germany
We consider the evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative game on an adaptive network, where the strategies of agents, cooperation or defection, feed back on their local interaction topology. While mutual cooperation is the social optimum, unilateral defection yields a higher payoff and undermines the evolution of cooperation. Although no a priori advantage is given to cooperators, an intrinsic dynamical mechanism can lead asymptotically to a state of almost full cooperation. In finite systems, this state is characterized by long periods of strong cooperation interrupted by sudden episodes of predominant defection, suggesting a possible mechanism for the systemic failure of cooperation in real-world systems.