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SOE: Fachverband Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
SOE 7: Evolutionary Game Theory I (with BP)
SOE 7.2: Vortrag
Dienstag, 23. März 2010, 10:00–10:15, H44
Coordination with switching costs: A case for percolation in socioeconomic networks — •Carlos P. Roca1, Moez Draief2, and Dirk Helbing1,3 — 1Chair of Sociology, in particular of Modeling and Simulation, ETH Zurich, Switzerland — 2Intelligent Systems and Networks Group, Imperial College London, UK — 3Santa Fe Institute, USA
Coordination is ubiquitous in social and economic interactions [1,2]. An important but not much studied issue is the influence of the costs involved in the switching of strategy, which however can be very relevant to important situations such as inefficient norms [3] or competition in technological markets [4]. We propose an extension of a binary coordination game to investigate this problem. We study it on degree-homogeneous random networks, observing that the outcome is greatly influenced by the underlaying network. The dependence on the network degree is highly non-trivial and extremely large degrees are needed to recover the mean field results. The explanation of this unexpected behavior resides in a particular kind of percolation process that takes place in the networked population. These results strongly suggest that percolation phenomena may be crucial in social and economic networks when coordination interactions are in play.
[1] Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study, Harvard University Press, 1969 [2] Harsany and Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, 1988 [3] Mahoney, Theory and Society 29, 507-548, 2000 [4] Klemperer, The Review of Economic Studies, 62, 515-539, 1995