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AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 1: Epistemological and Conceptual Foundations

AGPhil 1.4: Vortrag

Montag, 14. März 2011, 15:30–16:00, BEY 154

Are physical theories probable? — •Wolfgang Pietsch — Philosophy of Science, TU München, Germany

It is considered if one can sensibly ascribe probabilities to physical theories. As emphasized in particular by Karl Popper, the issue is intricately linked with the question if the method of physics is inductive or rather hypothetico-deductive. Also, the issue is crucial for determining if scientific reasoning in physics can be spelled out in Bayesian terms. My argument proceeds as follows: First, it is pointed out that physical theories always contain conventions besides empirical hypotheses. Second, it is argued that it constitutes a category mistake to speak of the probability of conventions. Third, it is shown that in abstract theories like physics conventions and empirical hypotheses cannot be clearly separated. These three premises allow to conclude that it constitutes a category mistake to speak of the probability of physical theories.