Bereiche | Tage | Auswahl | Suche | Aktualisierungen | Downloads | Hilfe

AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 6: Spacetime Theories

AGPhil 6.1: Hauptvortrag

Mittwoch, 16. März 2011, 11:00–11:45, BEY 154

Static vs. Dynamic Views of Temporal Existence in Relativistic Spacetimes — •Cord Friebe — Universität Bonn, Institut für Philosophie

Special Relativity allegedly contradicts presentism, the view that empirical objects or events only exist if they are present, and favours, apparently, the block universe view according to which objects or events exist independently of being present by being located at some spacetime point or other. In the light of recent developments in the analytic philosophy of time, however, the expression "block universe" turns out to be highly ambiguous: What is called, by philosophers, "eternalis" is 'more dynamic' than the physicist's "block universe"; and, consequently, what is called "presentism" is 'more dynamic' even than Newtonian spacetimes or spacetimes with a cosmic time. The aim of my talk is to clarify the terminology, in spelling out "presentism" and the "block universe view", and to sketch the consequences for re-interpreting relativistic spacetime theories.