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DY: Fachverband Dynamik und Statistische Physik
DY 25: Networks: From Topology to Dynamics III (with BP, SOE)
DY 25.6: Talk
Wednesday, March 16, 2011, 16:45–17:00, GÖR 226
The role of short-cuts for the emergence of cooperation in random topologies. — •Daniele Vilone1, Angel Sánchez1, and Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes2 — 1GISC - Mathematics Department, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain — 2Biocomputation and Complex Systems Institute, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain
We present a detailed study about the role of the short-cuts of a network in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a population of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model which allows to tune the topology of the system from the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) to the complete graph just changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p->1 cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results. Our work makes it clear how short-cuts can be decisive in promoting (or suppressing) cooperation in the absence of other mechanisms such as clustering. Implications for other dynamics are also drawn.