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AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 6: History and Philosophy of Physics

AGPhil 6.2: Vortrag

Mittwoch, 28. März 2012, 15:15–15:45, H 2033

Kant’s Theory of Mathematical Physics — •Katharina Kraus — Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH, United Kingdom

Kant’s theory of natural science neither follows Leibniz’s rational metaphysics nor fully endorses Newton’s and Galileo’s mathematical foundation of the sciences. Rather, Kant proposes a theory according to which scientific cognition results from a combination of metaphysical concept formation and mathematical construction. The äpplication" of mathematics to concepts that are metaphysically derived presupposes a special metaphysics of nature. For Kant, mathematical physics as a pure, synthetic a priori natural science is paradigmatic for all sciences. In this paper, I will present three different lines of interpretation of the special metaphysics of nature, the weak reading according to Buchdahl’s (1969) looseness of fit" between transcendental principles and empirical laws, Friedman’s (1992) strong reading suggesting a strong correspondence between them, and an alternative reading according to Plaass’ (1965) idea of metaphysical construction. A comparison of these three interpretations will show which of them could still be appropriate to a philosophical foundation of modern physics. I will also examine to what extent Kant’s idea of a pre-mathematical metaphysical concept formation could be seen as a precursor of a semantic view of theories.