Regensburg 2013 – scientific programme
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BP: Fachverband Biologische Physik
BP 3: Statistical Physics in Biological Systems I (joint with DY)
BP 3.8: Talk
Monday, March 11, 2013, 11:15–11:30, H47
Evolutionary game dynamics between random mutants — •Weini Huang1, Bernhard Haubold2, Christoph Hauert3, and Arne Traulsen1 — 1Evolutionary Theory Group, Max Planck Insitute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306, Plön,Germany — 2Bioinformatics Group,Max-Planck-Insitute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306, Plön,Germany — 3Department of Mathematics, The University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver V6T1Z2, British Columbia, Canada
Polymorphism occurs when more than one genotype or phenotype exist in the same population. Although polymorphisms are often observed in populations, the emergence and maintenance of polymorphsims remain unclear.We investigate this question by introducing a new model, named as mutant games. In evolutionary game theory, the interactions of different types in a population are described by payoff matrices. However, the number of types is usually fixed and payoff matrices are typically predefined. This can be a limit to model a biological population with random mutations. In our mutant games, the interactions of mutants and resident types are represented by a dynamical payoff matrix. The resulting dynamics caused by random mutants under frequency dependent selection, leads to a remarkably higher diversity, compared to the mutants under constant selection. Interestingly, although arbitrary number of mutants are allowed in mutant games, an intermediate level of diversity is maintained.