Bereiche | Tage | Auswahl | Suche | Aktualisierungen | Downloads | Hilfe

SOE: Fachverband Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme

SOE 14: Evolutionary Game Theory (joint with BP and DY)

SOE 14.1: Vortrag

Dienstag, 12. März 2013, 15:00–15:15, H37

How selection pressure changes the nature of social dilemmas in structured populations — •Flavio Pinheiro^1,2, Francisco Santos^1,3, and Jorge Pacheco^1,4 — ¹ATP-Group CMAF at Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal — ²Centro de Física at Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal — ³Departamento de Engenharia Informática & INESC-ID, IST-UTL, Lisboa Portugal — ⁴Departamento de Matemática e Aplicações at Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal

When members of a population engage in dyadic interactions reflecting a prisoner's dilemma game, the evolutionary dynamics depends crucially on the population structure, described by means of graphs and networks. Here, we investigate how selection pressure contributes to change the fate of the population. We find that homogeneous networks, in which individuals share a similar number of neighbors, are very sensitive to selection pressure, whereas strongly heterogeneous networks are more resilient to natural selection, dictating an overall robust evolutionary dynamics of coordination. Between these extremes, a whole plethora of behaviors is predicted, showing how selection pressure can change the nature of dilemmas populations effectively face. We further show how the present results for homogeneous networks bridge the existing gap between analytic predictions obtained in the framework of the pair-approximation from very weak selection and simulation results obtained from strong selection.