Dresden 2014 – scientific programme

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DY: Fachverband Dynamik und Statistische Physik

DY 31: Evolutionary Game Theory and Economic Models (joint session SOE/ BP/ DY)

DY 31.5: Talk

Thursday, April 3, 2014, 12:00–12:15, GÖR 226

Opportunistic strategies and the emergence of responsible punishment — •Arne Traulsen — Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Evolutionary Theory Group, Plön, Germany

One way to promote cooperation among selfish actors is to allow for the opportunity to punish those peers who do not cooperate. However, the vast majority of models and behavioral experiments considers situations in which actors cannot assess whether it is likely that they will be punished. If this information is available, opportunistic strategies that act according to this information become possible and lead to the emergence of responsible punishment targeted at non-cooperators only, without the problems of antisocial punishment, second order free-riding or spite. Also for institutional, so called pool punishment, such opportunistic strategies are successful, which implies that the presence of punishment institutions should be made public.