Berlin 2015 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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SOE: Fachverband Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
SOE 6: Evolutionary Game Theory I (joint session SOE / BP / DY)
SOE 6.2: Vortrag
Montag, 16. März 2015, 15:15–15:30, MA 001
When do microscopic assumptions determine the outcome in evolutionary game dynamics? — •Bin Wu1, Bebedikt Bauer1, Tobias Galla2, and Arne Traulsen1 — 1Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Ploen, Germany — 2Theoretical Physics, School of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types of microscopic models, including in particular fitness-based selection rules and imitation-based dynamics, are often used as if they were interchangeable. We challenge this view and investigate how robust these choices on the micro-level really are. Focusing on a key macroscopic quantity, the probability for a single mutant to take over a population of wild-type individuals, we show that there is a unique pair of a fitness- based process and an imitation process leading to identical outcomes for arbitrary games and for all intensities of selection. This highlights the perils of making arbitrary choices at the micro-level without regard of the consequences at the macro-level.