Heidelberg 2015 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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Q: Fachverband Quantenoptik und Photonik
Q 67: Quantum Information: Quantum Communication II
Q 67.7: Vortrag
Freitag, 27. März 2015, 12:30–12:45, K/HS1
Trojan-horse attacks on practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems — •Imran Khan1,2, Nitin Jain1,2, Birgit Stiller1,2, Paul Jouguet3, Sébastien Kunz-Jacques3, Eleni Diamanti4, Vadim Makarov5, Christoph Marquardt1,2, and Gerd Leuchs1,2 — 1Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Guenther-Scharowsky-Str. 1/Bldg. 24, 91058 Erlangen, Germany — 2Institute for Optics, Information and Photonics, University of Erlangen-Nuernberg, Staudtstraße 7/B2, 91058 Erlangen, Germany — 3SeQureNet, 23 avenue d'Italie, 75013 Paris, France — 4LTCI, CNRS - Telecom ParisTech, 46 rue Barrault, 75013 Paris, France — 5Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations may deviate from the assumptions made in security proofs for QKD protocols. Quantum hacking uses this potential gap to demonstrate possible attacks on such systems. Here, we experimentally demonstrate a Trojan-horse attack on a laboratory continuous-variable QKD system with a success rate of 98.73 % to read out the state of Alice's modulator. Furthermore, we study the feasibility of this attack on a similar commercial system. At the same time we offer possible countermeasures.