Dresden 2017 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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SOE: Fachverband Physik sozio-ökonomischer Systeme
SOE 9: Evolutionary Game Theory (joint session SOE / BP / DY)
SOE 9.2: Vortrag
Dienstag, 21. März 2017, 11:15–11:30, GÖR 226
Anomalous Long-Term Behavior in Evolutionary Dynamics from Ergodicity Breaking — •Jan Nagler1 and Frank Stollmeier2 — 1ETH Zurich — 2MPI DS, Network Dynamics, Göttingen
Fluctuating environments determine life, ranging from the early stages of molecular evolution to the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in our society. Predicting the long-term evolution of species and strategies in uncertain environments is a long-standing challenge in evolutionary dynamics. For evolutionary games where the payoff a player receives is dependent on the fluctuating environmental state, we predict the dynamics in the long-term, i. e. the game's stationary states. For deterministically and stochastically varying payoff structures we find anomalous, sometimes counterintuitive, long-term behaviors which are markedly different from traditional games defined by constant payoffs. Intricately, the anomalous stationary states are sensitive to the covariance of the payoffs. In contrast to evolutionarily stable states of games with constant payoffs, where coexisting species necessarily receive equal payoffs, anomalous stable states can be unfair, meaning that, on average, two coexisting species may receive different payoffs. Moreover, environmental noise can induce transitions between different games. We introduce a classification for evolutionary games with payoff stochasticity, which contains the traditional games for vanishing payoff variance. Our framework, developed here analytically, robustly predicts the long-term evolution of species and strategies in fluctuating environments.