Bonn 2020 – scientific programme

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AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 3: Space, Time and Symmetry II

AGPhil 3.1: Invited Talk

Tuesday, March 31, 2020, 17:00–17:45, H-HS IV

Why initial conditions aren't so special — •Matt Farr — University of Cambridge, UK

The early universe is thought to be extremely low probability in a way that calls for explanation. Some have used the `initialness defence' to argue that initial (as opposed to final) conditions are intrinsically special in that they don't require further explanation. Such defences commonly assume a primitive directionality of time to distinguish between initial and final conditions. I outline and support a deflationary account of the initialness defence, and argue that although there is no intrinsic difference between initial and final conditions, once we have sufficient structure to discern between them we should not seek explanations of low-probability initial conditions.