SKM 2021 – scientific programme

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AGA: Arbeitsgruppe Physik und Abrüstung

AGA 2: Disarmament Verification II

AGA 2.1: Invited Talk

Thursday, September 30, 2021, 11:15–12:00, H8

TPNW Verification: Domains, Boundary Conditions, Priorities & Problems — •Thomas E. Shea — Vienna

The TPNW provides a potential framework for eliminating existing arsenals in all nine nuclear-armed states, eliminating critical nuclear weapons infrastructure, and detecting any attempts to rearm in the future. The TPNW will require a verification system tailored to each nuclear-armed state reflecting its nuclear programs and respecting its laws governing nuclear safety and security. Each verification system should address eleven pursuits. Full verification will be costly, sometimes controversial, and will likely require prolonged periods before a state can be declared to be disarmed. Finding hidden weapons and clandestine manufacturing and support facilities will require the use of information obtained by the verification authorities together with information provided by states and other parties. Cybersecurity considerations will govern which verification technologies will be approved by each nuclear-armed state to prevent espionage and approved by the verification authorities to assure scientific authenticity