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AGPhil: Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie der Physik

AGPhil 9: Philosophy of Physics 1

AGPhil 9.2: Talk

Wednesday, March 20, 2024, 12:00–12:30, PTB SR AvHB

Do atemporal theories of quantum gravity presuppose the notion of time? — •Anastasiia Lazutkina — University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany

I examine an argument proposed by Henrik Zinkernagel against quantum fundamentalism (QF), the view that everything is fundamentally of a quantum nature (ontological QF) and can be described exclusively in quantum theoretical terms (epistemological QF). According to Zinkernagel, the absence of time in the main approaches in quantum gravity (QG) leads to a problem for QF. The central claim is that timeless QG cannot be more fundamental than general relativity (GR) because its central field of application, the early universe, is defined by a classical relativistic time concept - global time. And global time is based on Weyl's principle that requires well-defined notions of local time and length, which lose their physical basis in the early universe. Thus, QG relies on GR and cannot be more fundamental. I propose two readings of the argument: the first fails, while the second is successful but requires accepting a broad set of epistemological commitments like Niels Bohr's holism and Peter Zinkernagel's conditions of objectivity. Even if these commitments are accepted, I conclude that in this second extended form the argument only refutes the epistemological but not ontological version of QF.

Keywords: quantum fundamentalism; quantum gravity; the problem of time; Niels Bohr