Bonn 2025 – wissenschaftliches Programm
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QI: Fachverband Quanteninformation
QI 18: Quantum Networks, Repeaters, and QKD III (joint session Q/QI)
QI 18.6: Vortrag
Mittwoch, 12. März 2025, 12:15–12:30, AP-HS
Detection of Intercept-Resend Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution with Waveguide-Integrated Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detectors — •Connor A. Graham-Scott1,3,4, Roland Jaha2,3,4, Konstantin Zaitsev5, Polina Acheva5, Robin Terhaar2,3,4, Wolfram Pernice2,3,4, Vadim Makarov5, and Carsten Schuck1,3,4 — 1Department of Quantum Technologies, University of Münster, Germany — 2Kirchhoff-Institute for Physics, University of Heidelberg, Germany — 3Center for Nanotechnology, Münster, Germany — 4Center for Soft Nanoscience, Münster, Germany — 5Quantum Hacking and Certification Lab, Vigo Quantum Communication Center, Spain
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers secure communication via quantum mechanics but is vulnerable to eavesdroppers exploiting single-photon detectors with high-intensity optical pulses to blind and control them. Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) can be attacked by manipulating the decaying-edge of the signal around a comparator trigger voltage, enabling quantum key replication.
We demonstrate that waveguide-integrated SNSPDs counteract such attacks by inducing a permanent resistive latching state above single-photon optical intensities without compromising performance. Testing devices with kinetic inductance from 625nH to 41nH revealed that lower-inductance devices (41nH) latched under multi-photon pulses, exposing eavesdropping attempts. This establishes waveguide-integrated SNSPDs as a secure solution for eavesdropping in QKD.
Keywords: Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detectors; Waveguide-Integrated; Quantum Key Distribution; Intercept-Resend Blinding Attack; Quantum Hacking